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Carsten: Constitutional Law: Narrowing the Scope of the Fourth Amendment

CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)
Tamra J Carsten*
A Lago Vista police officer arrested Petitioner,' without a warrant, for
violating a Texas seatbelt law,2 a misdemeanor punishable only by fine
Petitioner filed suit,4 alleging Respondents5 had violated her Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.6 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary
judgment for Respondents based on Petitioner's admission that she had
violated the law.7 On appeal, apanel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that an arrest for a first-time
seatbelt offense was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.' Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reinstated the District
Court's summary judgment for Respondents.9 The United States Supreme
* For my parents, Lawrence and Joan Carsten.
1. Petitioner is Gail Atwater, a long-time resident of Lago Vista. Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346 (2001). At the time of the arrest, she was driving her children home from
soccer practice. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380,382 (5th Cir. 1999). She was driving
at fifteen miles per hour through her neighborhood when Respondent pulled her over. Id.
2. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413 (Vernon 2001). The Texas statute provides that
front-seat passengers of cars equipped with seatbelts must wear them. Id. § 545.413(a). In addition,
it provides that drivers must secure small children riding in the front. Id. § 545.413(b).
3. Id. § 545.413(d). Violation of section 545.413(a) carries a maximum penalty of a fifty
dollar fine. Id.
4. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325. Petitioner filed suit in a Texas state court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Id. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: "Every person who... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2001). The City removed the suit to federal court. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325.
5. Respondents are Officer Bart Turek, City of Lago Vista, and Chief of Police Frank
Miller. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The panel based its conclusion on its assessment that Petitioner was not a serious
repeat offender, did not pose a flight risk, and did not pose a safety risk to the officer or to the
public. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1999). In addition, the panel
noted that Respondent was an overzealous police officer acting only to harass Petitioner. Id. at 388.
9. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 325. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arrest was reasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was based on probable cause and because
it was not conducted in an extraordinary manner. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 245
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Court granted certiorari,"° and in affirming the decision of the Court of
Appeals, HELD that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by
fine. 1
The Fourth Amendment provides for the right of people to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 Traditionally, searches and
seizures are reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when an officer has either a warrant or probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed an offense. 3 Evidence uncovered during
searches incident to unlawful arrests is inadmissible against defendants in
subsequent prosecution. 4 The probable cause threshold, however, is not
without exception. In Terry v. Ohio," the Court recognized limited
circumstances under which searches and seizures are reasonable in the
absence of probable cause.16
In Terry, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of police "stop-andfrisk" procedures.17 Respondent, believing that Petitioner was
contemplating a store robbery," detained Petitioner and patted him down
for weapons.' 9 The frisk uncovered a gun in Petitioner's overcoat, resulting
in prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon.2" Although Petitioner's
conduct fell short of probable cause,2 ' the Court reasoned that the need for

(5th Cir. 1999).
10. Atwater, 532 U.S. at326.
11. Id. at354.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment reads in pertinent part: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." Id.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,418 (1976); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
14. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). "[P]olice conduct which is overbearing or
harassing... must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence
in criminal trials." Id. Further, the Court stated that the rule excluding evidence unlawfully seized
is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct. Id. at 12.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 24. The Court concluded that it would be unreasonable to deny police officers the
authority to conduct a weapons search of a person behaving suspiciously, even where probable
cause is lacking. Id.
17. Id. at9-10.
18. Id. at 6. Petitioner and another man walked by a store and peered in the window
approximately a dozen times. The officer suspected that they were "casing ajob." Id.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 7-8. The trial court found that it would be "stretching the facts beyond reasonable
comprehension" to find that the officer had probable cause. Id.
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effective law enforcementP and officer safety' warranted a departure from
traditional probable cause requirements."
The Court applied a balancing test, weighing the need to search or seize
against the degree of intrusion the search or seizure would have upon the
individual's security.' The Court held that Respondent's "stop-and-frisk"
of Petitioner passed the balancing test and was thus reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.26 Accordingly, the gun was properly admitted into
evidence. Reluctant to apply a blanket rule, however, the Court noted that
the constitutionality of "stop-and-frisk" procedures must be decided on a
case-by-case basis.2"
The Court has been less willing to deviate from traditional standards
when evaluating claims that searches and seizures are unreasonable despite
the existence ofprobable cause. 9 In UnitedStatesv. Robinson,3 the Court
refused to hold that a full custodial arrest of a person driving without a
license violated the Fourth Amendment.3 Rather, the Court held that the
arrest was lawful because the officer had probable cause to believe that
Respondent was driving while his license was revoked." Thus, the Court
concluded that the search incident to the arrest, which uncovered heroin,
formed-a proper basis for Respondent's drug conviction.33
Relying on the Court's holding in Terry, Respondent argued that
because a search could yield no further evidence of driving without a
license, Petitioner was limited to a frisk for weapons only.34 The Court
disagreed.35 Recognizing that an absolute authority to search incident to a

22. Id. at 20.
23. Id. at 24. The Court explained that many police officers are killed in the line of duty, most
as a result of gun and knife wounds. Id. at 23-24. In 1966, fifty-seven officers were killed in the line
of the duty in the United States, and another 23,851 were assaulted. Id. at 24. "In view of these

facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and
other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an
arrest." Id.

24. Id.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
414 U.S.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
Id. at31.
Id. at 30.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806,817 (1996); United States v. Robinson,
218, 235 (1973).
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. at235-36.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
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lawful arrest exists only in dicta, 6 the Court considered whether searches
based on probable cause should be scrutinized for further justification. 7
In reaching its decision, the Court investigated the need for officers to
make ad hoc decisions in the field." Ultimately, the Court decided that
probable cause alone is sufficient justification for conducting a search
incident to a lawful arrest.39 To rule otherwise would undermine the goal
of effective law enforcement.40 The Court, however, left open the question
of whether its holding would stand when an officer's decision to make an
arrest deviated from standard police practice. 4'
The Supreme Court revisited this question in Whren v. UnitedStates,4 2
and answered in the affirmative.43 The Court in Whren considered whether
44
an officer's subjective intent can invalidate an otherwise lawful arrest.
Petitioners were pulled over for speeding and failing to signal.45 Upon
observing crack cocaine in plain view, the officer placed Petitioners under
arrest.46 Petitioners, two African-American males, 47 alleged that the officer
lacked probable cause to believe they were dealing drugs. 48 The detention,
they argued, was pretext for a narcotics search.49

36. Id. at 230.
37. See id. at 233-34.
38. Id. at 235.
39. Id.
40. See id.But see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 513 (1983) ("We must not allow our zeal
for effective law enforcement to blind us to the peril to our free society that lies in this Court's
disregard of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.") (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221 n.1.
We think it is sufficient for purposes of our decision that respondent was lawfully
arrested for an offense, and that.., placing him in custody following that arrest
was not a departure from established police department practice. We leave for
another day questions which would arise on facts different from these.
Id. The Court also identified the Fourteenth Amendment as a potential basis for scrutiny. See id.
at 236.
42. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
43. Id. at 819.
44. Id. at 808.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 809.
47. Id. at 810.
48. Id. at 809.
49. Id.Petitioners argued that the officers would not have pulled them over simply to enforce
the traffic laws and that the sole purpose for the stop was to conduct a narcotics search. Id. They
urged the Court to consider not whether the officers had probable cause to make the stop, but
whether a reasonable officer would have enforced the traffic laws. Id. at 810.
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The Court agreed that racial motivation may give rise to discriminatory
enforcement of traffic laws." But the Court also found that officer intent
is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis, 5 except when a search or
seizure is conducted in an extraordinary manner.5 2 Further, the Court
identified the Fourteenth Amendment as an alternative route to recovery. 3
Reasoning that the officer had probable cause to believe that Petitioners
had violated the traffic laws and that the arrest was not conducted in an
extraordinary manner, the Court held that the arrest was reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 4 Thus, the drug convictions were
upheld.55
Like Robinson and Whren, the instant Court reaffirmed the sufficiency
of probable cause to uphold a seizure under the Fourth Amendment 6
Focusing on both traditionr 57 and practicality, the instant Court rejected
Petitioner's proposal of a modem rule which would restrict police
authority to make custodial arrests for minor infractions.58 This rule,
modeled after the Terry balancing test, would require the government to
articulate a compelling need for immediate detention each time an arrest
is made pursuant to a violation not punishable by jail time.59 Relying on
Robinson, the instant Court stated that case-by-case analysis would
undermine the goal of effective law enforcement." Further, the Court
warned against the floodgate of litigation that case-by-case analysis would
precipitate."
In reaching its decision, the instant Court compared the administrability
of the traditional rule with that of the modem rule.62 The instant Court

50. Id. at 813. "We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.at 818. The Court stated that "seizure by means of deadly force, unannounced entry
into a home, entry into a home without a warrant, [and] physical penetration of the body" may be
examples of searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner. Id. (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 813. The Court explained that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, rather than the Fourth Amendment, is the proper basis for bringing claims of
discriminatory enforcement. Id.
54. Id. at 819.
55. Id.
56. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
57. Upon an exhaustive review of case and statutory history, the Court concluded that the
common law majority rule authorized officers to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests upon
probable cause. d at 345.
58. Id. at 346.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 347.
61. Id. at 350. The Court also voiced the concern that case-by-case analysis would turn every
arrest into an occasion for constitutional review. Id. at 347.
62. See id. at 350. "Fourth Amendment rules 'ought to be expressed in terms that are readily
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focused on fallacies in the modem rule, such as its assumption that officers
are aware of complex penalty schemes and its disregard for the fact that
subsequent violations of a fine-only offense are oftenjailable. 63 The instant
Court characterized Petitioner's arrest as a "pointless indignity," admitting
that Petitioner might well prevail under a modem Terry-based rule. 64
Borrowing language from Whren, however, the instant Court held that the
arrest was not conducted in an extraordinary manner and was therefore
within Fourth Amendment bounds.65
In a strong dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, urged that the majority's ruling defies the
constitutional guarantee of the Fourth Amendment.66 Justice O'Connor
opined that while probable cause is necessary to effect a lawful custodial
arrest, it is not always sufficient.67 Particularly, she disapproved of the
majority's decision to set aside Petitioner's case on the merits in order to
curtail litigation.68 She also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the traditional probable cause threshold is more easily administrable than
a rule requiring the government to articulate legitimate grounds for making
a full custodial arrest.69
Further, Justice O'Connor distinguished the instant case from Whren.7"
Whren involved only a temporary detention, which is a much lesser
intrusion on an individual's security than a full custodial arrest.7' The
holding in Whren, she concluded, did not control the instant case.'
Finally, Justice O'Connor expressed her concern that unbridled discretion
to make custodial arrests would spawn high potential for abuse.'

applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are
necessarily engaged' and not 'qualified by all sorts ofifs, ands, and buts."' Id.at 347 (quoting New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
63. Id. at 348-49.
64. Id. at 346.
65. Id.at 353.
66. Id. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 362-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor, the majority
concluded that case and statutory history was inconclusive as to whether common law rules
prohibited warrantless misdemeanor arrests. Thus, she accused the majority of ignoring that
conclusion in order to obviate the need to apply the Terry balancing test. See id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained that even the probable
cause threshold is not a bright-line test. Id. "'The quantum of information which constitutes
probable cause ... must be measured by the facts of the particular case."' Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963)).
70. Id. at 363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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By upholding the validity of Petitioner's arrest even though it was
wholly unwarranted by government need,'4 the instant Court fashioned a
per se rule that probable cause is a sufficient condition to justify a
custodial arrest.75 This rule applies irrespective of the severity of the
offense, the risk to officer safety, and the motive of the arresting officer.76
A critical question is whether the instant Court's reasons for rejecting the
Terry balancing test in favor of a rigid rule are well-grounded.
The instant Court's ruling will defeat a wealth of otherwise valid
Fourth Amendment claims.77 Litigants, however, may circumvent the
ruling by raising similar claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,
asserting themselves as victims ofdiscriminatory enforcement.78 Thus, the
instant Court's attempt to curtail litigation may be ineffectual.
Additionally, by focusing on potential difficulties in administering a
modem rule, the instant Court declined to consider the imprecision of the
probable cause standard. Probable cause, itself being a rule of
reasonableness, may invoke as much ambiguity as a modem Terry-based
rule requiring the government to articulate a need for immediate
detention.79
The instant Court's decision may be a response to the broad rule
excluding evidence uncovered in searches incident to unlawful arrests.8"
Had the instant facts paralleled those of Whren and Robinson, inculpatory
evidence found in Petitioner's possession would be admissible against her
in criminal proceedings.8 By deeming all arrests upon probable cause
lawful, even arrests for minor traffic infractions, the instant Court
immunizes law enforcement against the exclusion of evidence on Fourth
Amendment technicalities. 2 While the instant Court's ruling promotes the
interest of effective law enforcement, one potential problem is that
effective law enforcement may turn into overzealous law enforcement,

74. See id. at 347.
75. See id.
76. See id.In dissent, Justice O'Connor states that "[a]fter today... [a]n officer's subjective
motivations for making a traffic stop are not relevant considerations in determining the
reasonableness of the stop." Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 346. "If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts
of this case, Atwater might well prevail." Id. "Atwater's claim to live free of pointless indignity and
confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against it specific to her case." Id.
78. See United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
79. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

80. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
81. See id.
82. See ict
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with minority groups as the targets.83 The Fourteenth Amendment,
however, may mitigate against this possibility.'
The instant Court's unwillingness to adopt a modem rule requiring the
government to articulate a clear need for immediate detention may reflect
a reluctance to create a disincentive to arrest.85 In borderline cases, officers
acting under a modem rule would be apt to avoid liability by not making
the arrest.86 This would result in non-enforcement of the law, leaving
criminal offenders at large and compromising the public welfare.87 Though
promoting effective law enforcement, the instant Court's reasoning
focuses on the aggregate effect of adopting a modem rule,88 which may
undermine individual Fourth Amendment safeguards.
Furthermore, the instant Court's ruling may relinquish to police
officers law-making authority reserved to state legislatures.89 In this case,
the Texas legislature made the violation of the seatbelt law a misdemeanor
punishable only by fine.9" Judging from the penalty, it is likely that the
Texas legislature deemed noncompliance a minor offense.9 Therefore, it
is unlikely that the Texas legislature intended for citizens to be arrested for
violating the seatbelt law.92 By upholding police authority to make full
custodial arrests incident to violation of fine-only misdemeanors, the
instant Court allows police officers to punish violators beyond the extent
of the law.93 In addition to being counterintuitive, this may be an
encroachment on the legislative function.9"

83. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. But see Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 (warning that the exclusionary
rule is not an effective means of thwarting harassment of minority groups by the police). See also
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,469 (1981) ("The mere fact that law enforcement may be made
more efficient can never by itselfjustify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.") (quoting Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)); United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 163 (6th Cir. 1995)
(condemning the temptation to uphold unlawful searches that have uncovered illegal contraband
in order to "let the end justify the means").
84. See supra text accompanying note 78.
85. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351 (2001).
86. See id.; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (discussing the
applicability of the qualified immunity defense). Cf Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641
(1987) (explaining that, under qualified immunity principles, an officer who is reasonable but
mistaken will not be liable). Thus, it appears that the qualified immunity defense may mitigate
against any likelihood of non-enforcement.
87. See Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 at 351.
88. Id. "Multiplied many times over, the costs to society of such underenforcement could
easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly arrested and booked." Id.
89. See id.at 365, 369 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(d) (1991).
91. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 365 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
92. See id.(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. See id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. See id.(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The instant Court's ruling raises another question. If an arrest
characterized as a "pointless indignity,""5 is not considered an "extraordinary ' 9 6 arrest, what then is an arrest conducted in an extraordinary
manner? The instant Court declined to give a definitive answer.97 The
ruling suggests, however, that the severity of the offense and the
offender's risk to officer safety have no bearing on whether an arrest is
"extraordinary."
One alternative basis for the instant Court's ruling would have more
tightly guarded the Fourth Amendment guarantee. Rather than
crystallizing the traditional rule that an arrest is reasonable upon probable
cause, the instant Court could have applied the Terry balancing test, citing
officer and public safety as the primary government interests to be
protected. Field decisions based on such factors would not be contingent
on officer awareness of penalty schemes, thus eliminating some concern
over the rule's administrability. This would strike a more even balance
between a per se rule and unbridled police discretion, and not at the cost
of effective law enforcement.
The instant Court's ruling has narrowed the scope of the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 9 The
judiciary has forfeited its power, and perhaps even its responsibility, to
place a check on police decisionmaking.99 As a result, there is little to
protect against intrusive searches and seizures, and citizens are more prone
to suffer abuse at the hands of the police.' 0 It is unlikely that the public
would appreciate the Court's abandonment of its authority for judicial
review.'°1

95. Id. at 347.
96. Id. at 355.
97. See id. at 354-55. The Court found that Atwater's arrest was "inconvenient and

embarrassing ... but not so extraordinary as to violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 355.
98. See I at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. See id at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100. See generallyMichele Deitch, Veto Risks Texans' CivilRights,DALLAS MORNING NEwS,
July 1, 2001, at 5J (describing the instant Court's decision as sacrificing civil liberties). "Such
unbounded discretion carries with it grave potential for abuse." Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372

(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. See generally Michele Deitch, Don't Lock People Up for Minor Offenses, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 4,2001, at 31A.
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